

## Message Text

SECRET

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42

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

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O 261534Z AUG 75

FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 6539

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE

USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T THE HAGUE 4300

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, SREF, EAID, PO, FR, N, GW, AO, UK

SUBJECT: PORTUGUESE POLITICAL CRISIS AND ALLIED DEMARCHE

REF: STATE 202520

1. IN VIEW OF CHARACTER AND URGENCY OF INSTRUCTIONS REFTEL  
I REQUESTED APPOINTMENT WITH FOREIGN MINISTER VAN DER STOEL  
WHO AGREED TO RECEIVE ME ON VERY SHORT NOTICE EARLY THIS  
AFTERNOON DESPITE FULL SCHEDULE RESULTING FROM ONGOING TWO-  
DAY ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF SOME 60 DUTCH CHIEFS OF MISSION,  
INCLUDING DUTCH AMBASSADOR TO LISBON.

2. AFTER HEARING MY PRESENTATION FOREIGN MINISTER SAID  
THAT GON WAS KEENLY AWARE OF PRESENT CRITICAL SUTIATION AND  
HAD HOPED OVER PAST WEEKEND FOR SOME CONSTRUCTIVE DEVELOP-  
MENTS. HE RECOGNIZED SITUATION WAS PRECARIOUS AND COULD  
STILL CHANGE MOMENTARILY. IN HIS JUDGMENT EC-9 JULY DECISION  
CONDITIONING AID FOR PORTUGAL ON DEMOCRATIC PLURALISM CON-  
STITUTED CONTINUING SIGNIFICANT FACTOR. HE BELIEVED THAT  
ANY NEW ACTION WITH LISBON WOULD PROBABLY BE MOST EFFECTIVE  
IF AGAIN IT REPRESENTED UNANIMOUS POSITION OF EC-9. FOR THIS  
REASON HE EXPRESSED DOUBT THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD WISH TO  
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TAKE INDEPENDENT INITIATIVE IN PRESENT SITUATION, THOUGH

HE WOULD CERTAINLY DISCUSS THIS POSSIBILITY WITH HIS CABINET COLLEAGUES ON BASIS OF US APPROACH. AT THE SAME TIME HE GAVE ME DISTINCT IMPRESSION THAT DUTCH WOULD PROBABLY PREFER IN ANY CASE TO CONSULT EC-9 COLLEAGUES, INCLUDING ITALIANS AS EC-9 PRESIDENT, BEFORE TAKING ACTION. FOR THIS REASON I REPEATED OUR ESTIMATE OF THE URGENCY OF PRESENT SITUATION, WHICH HE AGAIN ACCEPTED.

3. FOREIGN MINISTER NOTED THAT PRIME MINISTER DEN UYL AND HE, AS WELL AS FRG PM SCHMIDT AND SWEDISH PM PALME, HAD ALL MET SEPARATELY WITH PORTUGUESE PRESIDENT COSTA GOMES AT HELSINKI. ALL HAD EMERGED WITH DISTINCT IMPRESSION THAT PORTUGUESE PRESIDENT WAS WEAK, VACILLATING INDIVIDUAL WHO WAS IN NO SENSE HIS OWN MASTER. HELSINKI CONVERSATIONS HAD TAKEN PLACE IN ALL THREE INSTANCES IN PRESENCE OF OTHER PORTUGUESE, WHOSE FUNCTION SEEMED TO BE BOTH TO INSURE THAT PRESIDENT DID NOT ACT INDEPENDENTLY AND TO BE IN POSITION TO REPORT BACK TO OTHERS IN LISBON PRECISE TERMS OF CONVERSATIONS.

4. VAN DER STOEL EMPHASIZED THAT DUTCH AMBASSADOR TO PORTUGAL WAS NOW IN THE HAGUE FOR AMBASSADORIAL CONFERENCE AND WOULD BE HERE AT LEAST THROUGH TOMORROW. WHILE HE LEFT OPEN POSSIBILITY THAT AMBASSADOR MIGHT RETURN TO LISBON LATER THIS WEEK, THIS WAS NOT PRESENT PLAN SINCE AMBASSADOR HAD OTHER COMMITMENTS HERE THIS WEEK. FOREIGN MINISTER CONCLUDED CONVERSATION BY PROMISING TO INFORM ME AS SOON AS POSSIBLE CONCERNING DUTCH RESPONSE TO APPROACH.

5. ON BASIS THIS CONVERSATION IT APPEARS THAT DUTCH ARE UNLIKELY TO REACT TO US APPROACH WITHOUT CHECKING WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF EC-9. DUTCH MAY ALSO FEEL EVENTS IN LISBON ARE MOVING SO RAPIDLY THAT NEW APPROACH WOULD SERVE NO REAL PURPOSE. AT THE SAME TIME DUTCH INTEREST IN DEMOCRATIC EVOLUTION IN PORTUGAL IS SO STRONG THAT US APPROACH WILL UNDOUBTEDLY STRENGTHEN DISPOSITION TO EXERT MAXIMUM EFFECTIVE INFLUENCE.

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## Message Attributes

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